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HOW SHALL THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA REFORM THEIR LEGAL
PROCEDURE SO AS TO MAKE IT AN
INSTRUMENT OF JUSTICE?
HUGH EVANDER WILLIS.-

THE PROBLEM.
There is a general feeling among the people of the United States
that they are not securing justice under our present system for the
administration of justice, and that the time for another great law
reform is near at hand. It is not an unusual thing to hear such
charges as the following: That the average length of a law suit,
civil or criminal, is about three years; that most courts are from one
year to five years behind their dockets, though this country has
twenty times as many judges as England has; that, as a result of the
failure of our criminal procedure, .our country, in proportion to its
population, has eight times as many homicides as Italy, nine times
as many as Canada, thirteen times as many as Great Britain, and
twenty times as many as Germany; that in both state and federal
courts nearly fifty per cent of the cases appealed have been reversed;
that over fifty per cent of the questions appealed have turned upon
questions of pleading and practice (while in Europe new trials are
unknown; and in England, since 1890, new trials have been granted
in less than four per cent of the cases; and there has been no second
trial for thirty years in a common law case and none for fifty years
in an equity case); that in criminal cases especially failures to convict
are largely due to perjury, suppression of testimony, dispersion of
witnesses, manufacturing of evidence and bribery of jurors; that
the real cases of litigants are often not presented for trial, because of
mistakes in pleadings; that the expense of trials is so great that only
the rich can afford them and the state could make money in damage
cases by paying the amount of the judgments instead of trying the
cases; that witnesses are partizan; that clients with good cases are
often defeated, without their fault; that the situation has become
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so bad that the innocent often avoid the court room while the guilty
flock thereto; and that as a result of these conditions the profession
is full of shysters, ambulance chasers, police court hangers-on, pettifoggers, and the dishonest and unscrupulous. The people of the
country realize these conditions. Members of the legal profession
do not attempt to deny that they exist. All are looking for a solution.
Some of the most distinguished members of the legal profession are
the most conspicuous advocates of law reform. Legal and popular
magazines have abounded with statistics as to the defects of our
present system.
Because of the unanimity of the condemnation of our present
legal system for the administration of justice and of the demand for
law reform, this paper will not undertake to traverse this ground
again, but, starting with the assumption that there is a need for law
reform, will devote its time to a consideration of the causes of the
defects observable in our present system and to proposing certain
suggestions in the way of a solution of the problem of how to so reform
our legal procedure as to make it an instrument for justice.
Before propounding a solution let us consider our problem a
little further.
Most of the evils about which complaint generally is made, and
to which reference has been made above, are evils connected with
procedure and not with substantive law. The substantive law of the
United States needs not reform so much as it needs codification and
harmonization. If it in many respects is somewhat behind the
times, it will soon catch up. The substantive part of our common
law has always exhibited elements of growth and development.
The history of the substantive law has shown it constantly in a state
of change. It is a growth. It is an evolution. Its tendency is
toward perfection. It is flexible. But legal procedure is rigid. Its
tendency is toward imperfection. It grows, but its very growth is
an imperfection. Yet even legal procedure when considered by itself
needs no radical reform. The law of code pleading, when considered
as a science, is well nigh perfect. Grant that cases should be tried
on the theory of an issue, first formulated by attorneys, and no better
instrument for forming such issue could be found, unless possibly
in the old common law system of pleading. What has been said of
pleading will also apply to evidence and practice, though perhaps
not to practice so much as to evidence. Our rules of evidence are
eminently fair and scientific when considered by themselves. Assume
that attorneys must try cases and it is hard to think of making many
changes in any of the rules of legal procedure. The truth of the above
is demonstrated beyond peradventure by the report of a commission
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of one of the states of the Union. The Governor of this state appointed a commission composed of representative judges, attorneys, and
law teachers of the state to examine the rules of legal procedure
which obtained in that state with a view to discovering any needed
reform. Thereupon a report was to be transmitted to the Legislature
to help the latter in the work of reforming the legal procedure of the
state. This commission held session after session and carefully
went over th&entire subject of procedure, but after it was through
with all of its work of investigation and discussion it could agree upon
but two trifling recommendations to make in the way of reform-and
one of these recommendations was the abolition of an appeal from an
order overruling a demurrer! But when legal procedure in the United
States is considered from the higher standpoint of justice to society,
a different result is reached. It is then discovered that the rules of
pleading, evidence and practice are not producing social results.
Practically all of the evils about which complaint is made and
which have been catalogued above are the fault of trial attorneys.
The length of the law suits and delays in trials, except for the delays
caused by the practice of judges in writing long opinions, are the fault
of attorneys, who use these as weapons to win cases. The reversals
are due to attorneys, who either purposely or ignorantly get error
into the record or secure new trials for technicalities. Attorneys
are at fault in appealing cases which involve only questions of pleading
and practice. Perjury, bribery, suppression of testimony and dispersion of witnesses are brought about by attorneys. The losing of
meritorious cases because of mistakes in pleading, or in conduct of
trial, is due to attorneys. The partisanship of witnesses is due to
attorneys. The expense is caused by attorneys. If final judgments
are just in most cases which are finally carried through all the steps
of litigation and reported, it constitutes the miracle in the administration of justice in the United States; and is due largely to the noble
work of the judges and to the excellence of the substantive law.
The complaints about legal procedure do not touch the results actually
finally reached in litigated cases, so much as they touch the difficulties
to the litigants in securing such final results, the cases which are begun
but never reach final judicial settlement, the cases which are never properly presented to the courts, the cases which are never begun because
of dread of the system. The blame for this situation rests on trial
attorneys.
It should not be inferred from what is said above that this
article intends to convey the impression that in the United States all
attorneys are bad and all judges are good. It is true that the judicial
ermine does seem to have some effect upon the character of men.
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The same man is more liable to be upright as a judge than as an attorney. Yet the complaint against attorneys is not a complaint against
them personally but officially. The fault is in the system which
farms out the administration of justice to private parties. It is
trial attorneys as such who are the subject of criticism. The claim
is not that all, or a large part of trial attorneys are bad as individuals,
but that they are all bad as trial attorneys.
Still the attorneys of today in the United States are no worse
as trial attorneys than the attorneys of the past. I believe that on
the average they, as individuals, are of higher character than those
of the past. I believe that substantive law has been, from the
standpoint of justice, in a constant state of improvement through
the ages. And I believe that there has been some such improvement
in legal procedure and in the work of attorneys as trial attorneys.
But we desire the work of legal evolution to go on, and I believe that
to any progress along this line or to any reform that amounts to
anything it is necessary, first, to agree as to what is the cause of our
legal evils and then to decide what is the best feasible method of
eliminating the. same irrespective of who may suffer (provided it is
not society). Make-shifts, patch-work, and temporary expedients
will no longer do.
THE SOLUTION.
How shall the people of the United States reform their legal
procedure so as to make it an instrument for justice on earth instead
of a highly wrought, beautiful, but complicated, unworkable machine?
The writer would like to suggest the solution set forth in the
following pages for the consideration of those interested in the reform
of our legal procedure.
. Place the administration of justice entirely in the hands of the
State.' Let officers of the State appointed by the duly chosen representatives of the people (perhaps according to the proposed California
plan) decide the legal disputes of the people. If the administration
of justice is not a matter for the State, what else can be? The State
declares what shall be legal rights, defines what shall amount to
violations thereof, and provides the legal remedies available. It
should also administer those remedies.
How shall this reform be accomplished? By legislative actionpreferably uniform legislation, but by as little legislation as possible.
Everything but the plainest essentials should be left to the judges
themselves.
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Justice in the United States today is not administered by, the
State. It is administered by -private parties. The truth of this
statement obight to be self-evident to attorneys and judges. It has
been almost proven already in this article by the fixing upon
trial attorneys of responsibility for our wrongs of legal procedure. If
any further proof is needed take a typical case, follow it through
from beginning to end, and compare the work done by attorneys
with that done by judges. Justice is administered by trial attorneys,
as agents of those who employ them, and they are looking after their
own and their clients' good, but not the common good. There is a
thinly veiled fiction that attorneys are officers of the court, but that
this is a fiction no one knows better than the trial attorneys themselves.
Even these attorneys do not administer justice as a tribunal, commission, or committee. They are matched against each other on two
opposing sides, as teams. The outcome depends upon the skill and
endurance of the teams. Justice hangs upon the hazzard of a gamethe game of legal procedure-the greatest game in the world! It is
true that the state is represented at this game by judges and clerks,
but these officers of the state are not present solely or even chiefly
for the purpose of administering justice; they are present to see that
the game of legal procedure is played according to the rules of pleading,
evidence and practice. They are the impartial officials of the game.
Justice in specific cases may generally ultimately be obtained, but
it might as well be obtained by the playing of a football, or baseball
game, or often by a game of cards!
What is wanted to reform our legal procedure is not the re-call
of judges, but the re-call of attorneys from the actual trial of cases.
Judges ought to be increased in number, so as to sit as a body of three
instead of one, and should be appointed for life (subject to re-call in
the event that the people should then insist upon a re-call). Only
in this way shall we ever get judges who will uniformly rank high and
be fit to perform the almost sacred duties of judicial magistrates.
Attorneys should be relegated to private practice in name as they are
in fact. They should not be allowed to put selfish bungling hands on
the tools of legal procedure. Only in this way will it be possible to
administer justice as a sacred duty instead of as a game of chance.
As matters now stand trial attorneys may be said to have come
between the people and their agents-the judges and clerks of court.
It has been charged that the political representatives of the people
do not represent the people, because big business interests have
come between the people and their representatives and procured
those representatives to represent the big business interests. Whether
this is true or not, it is true that trial attorneys stand between the
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people and their judges and clerks. Perhaps judges and clerks are
not acting for the attorneys instead of for the people, but they are not
doing the work for the people which they should be 'doing. Trial
attorneys have slipped in and appropriated this work for themselves
without being appointed by the people to act for them. The way to
reform all this is not to re-call the judges (at least not until they
administer adjective law as fully as they decide upon substantive
law and not until they are appointed for life), for they are not to,
blame for the mistakes of legal procedure; but to re-call the advocates
who are to blame therefore and who have no business to be making the
mistakes, for they have no business to be meddling with the legitimate
work of the judicial branch of the State. This can be done only by
denying to attorneys the right to try cases and by requiring of judges
the obligation to try them.
"Every man his own lawyer," has been a popular slogan of the
past, but popular as the slogan has been, the result desired has not
been accomplished, because the obligation referred to has not been
imposed on judges, and that result will never be attained until it
has been so imposed.
Our legal procedure of the past has served a purpose, while the
substantive law was in a process of development. But now that it
has served its purpose it must go. It is now antiquated. It is not
in harmony with present day civilization. Trial attorneys have
unduly exalted it, largely because of their familiarity with it, until
they often can see nothing else. They have forgotten that legal
procedure is not an end, but only a means. It must not only be made
a means again, but a better means than ever before, and one adapted
to our developed substantive law. The only means thus adapted
is that of public, or social, legal procedure.
REASONS.
(1) The greatest reason has already been given. Our present
legal procedure is a failure and that failure is due to trial attorneys.
(2) Judges could adequately do the work of administering
justice.
(a) There are many historical proofs of the wisdom and success
of placing the administration of justice all in the hands of judges.
The English system is noticeably tending in this direction. The
Roman civil law as administered by Rome and by the modern nations
where the Roman civil law obtains, especially in Belgium, gives the
judges much of the power suggested herein. That finest flower of
the Roman civil law-the ecclesiastical law-gave the judges almost
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the identical power which is advocated in this article. The Hebrew
law perhaps came even closer to giving the judges the power outlined
herein. But we do not need to go to ancient times, nor to other
lands, for precedents. In our own land today we can find abundant
proof of the efficacy of this method of administering justice. It is
found in our juvenile courts and in the Municipal Courts of Chicago
and of many of our other cities; in the commissions which have been
appointed by state and federal governments; and even in the submission of cases to arbitration. Parties in legal dispute who submit
their disputes to arbitration are just as liable to get justice and more
liable to get it quickly, than if they follow the regular course of legal
procedure in this country, even though they submit their cases to
men who are not lawyers. If they should submit their cases to arbiters who were learned in the law, would not they be liable to get
better decisions? This is a dreadful indictment of our present system
of legal procedure! It is the shame of the common law!
(b) The Program. The entire conduct of cases should be in the
hands of the judges. Every step in the trial of a case from first to
last, as in the civil and ecclesiastical law, should take place in open
court under the direction and supervision of the judges. Each party
should be bound to be in court, and no notice should ever be given
by one to the other. No motions or orders should ever occur. Pleadings should be not for the purpose of forming an issue, but to inform
the court and other party of the nature of the cause of action, or defense
or counter-claim, and they should be submitted to a judge for approval before being admitted. These pleadings, though written,
should be simple and informal, and could be drawn up either by a
practicing* attorney, or by the litigant himself, or possibly by the
clerk or by a public attorney appointed for that purpose. There
should be no demurrers, nor traverses; but a party should admit
or deny, and the pleadings should be tried one at a time in order.
A case started in the wrong court should be transferred. The judges
should impanel the jury, and examine the parties on oath and also
the witnesses. The proceedings should be mostly oral and the clerks
should take minutes of the same. Any act required to be done in
writing should be filed with the clerk. The judges should be supposed
to know whatever the clerks know. The court should grant any
relief, or defense, or cross demand which the law requires. There
should be no appeal, but the higher courts should review the decisions
of lower courts of their own motion, as in Belgium, or grant a rehearing
on petition. A higher court should be allowed to take additional
evidence and should render final judgment. A case should never be
remanded. Judges should know the rules of evidence, but they
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should not obtrude them into the court room. A violation of any one
of them should not be a reversible error. A few necessary rules
of practice for the guidance of the parties should be announced by
the courts, but even these should be directory not mandatory.
These are the steps necessarily incident to a law suit and all of
these could be taken by judges, as is proven by the fact that they have
all been taken by them elsewhere.
(3)" Attorneys are not needed in the work of the court room.
(a) The present rules of pleading, evidence and practice are
largely useless. They are necessary only if attorneys administer
justice. They would have no place--except perhaps in the back of
the judges' heads-if the administration of justice were committed
entirely to a tribunal of judges. The present rules of legal procedure
exist for the attorneys and are so complicated, technical and uncertain
that judges might often make mistakes in applying them without
the advice of counsel. If attorneys were prohibited to play the game
these rules would not be needed. " The only rules that would be needed
then would be a very few announced by the court to regulate the procedure of the court (directory not mandatory), and the court could
certainly apply these without the assistance of attorneys.
(b) Susbtantive law has now become a wonderfully complete
and fairly satisfactory system. Its various principles have been so
thoroughly wrought out and applied that judges no longer need the
assistance of attorneys even here as was once the case. That there
are better methods than the research and arguments of attorneys for
determining what are the true principles and what has been the
development of substantive law has been abundantly proven by the
work of some of the teachers in our law schools-as for example
Wigmore, Pound, Williston, Holmes and Ames. But if the assistance
of attorneys should be still needed for the correct discovery and application of the principles of substantive law there would be no
objection to the continuance of the practice, in this respect, as of old.
The criticism of attorneys does not touch their work in the field of
substantive law-at least so far as they help to discover it, though
perhaps a few of them are subject to criticism for selling their talents to
persons who wish to evade it-but it touches their work in the field
of legal procedure.
(4) Attorneys have no divine right to their monopoly of legal
procedure.
There was a time in both American and English history when
justice was administered without the assistance of attorneys. In the
beginning of English history private parties administered their own
justice in the form of self help and vengeance. Then the state
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regulated to a certain extent this private administration of justice.
Regulated vengeance and self-help were succeeded by the AngloSaxon ordeal and wager of law. These in turn were succeeded by the
Norman wager of battle and jury trials. At length the attorney
as an intellectual champion succeeded the physical champion of the
wager of battle. Even after attorneys had their hands on the reins
of legal procedure in England, the colonies in America were administering justice without the assistance of attorneys, because
there were none. By the time of the revolution-after the English
common law had supplanted the various systems of law (many of them
more Hebrew law than common law) which existed in the colonies-the attorney came into his own in the United States.
Historically one of the chief reasons why attorneys have been
able to retain their ascendency has been the idea of individualism,
which swept over the world in Adam Smith's day and which has only
recently begun to lose its potency. It will be noticed that throughout
English history the tendency has been for the State to take over more
and more of legal procedure and leave less and less of this to the
control of private individuals. This tendency was arrested for a
time by the doctrine of individualism. This doctrine has fallen
down. It is seen now that the State must exercise functions not permitted by the doctrine of individualism, notably in connection with
big business. Since the doctrine of individualism has failed, is it not
time for the State also to take over all the work of administering
justice just as it has assumed other functions? Should not the
hands of attorneys be loosed from the reins of legal procedure? Should
not the tendency toward government control and operation of the
machinery of justice be allowed to go on until it is no longer a private
matter in any respect?
Such is surely the trend of the times. Whether we will admit it or
not, we are moving rapidly in the direction of placing all of the administration of justice into the hands of officers of the State. Specific
examples of such trend are the creations of state and federal commissions, such as those to regulate public callings and pursuant to
employer's liability acts, the agitation for compulsory arbitration, the
creation of juvenile courts, the organization of municipal legal aid
societies and the appointment of public defenders. Why not admit
the inevitable and allow to be done at once and directly what sooner or
later social pressure will compel to be done indirectly?
(5) But it will be asked: Do not parties have the constitutional
right to be represented by counsel?
Our federal and state constitutions do contain provisions
guaranteeing to the accused in criminal trials the right to be thus
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represented. This is a relic of the times when the people and the
government were two different things, and perhaps it is still appropriate so long as the government has public prosecutors who, because
elective, think and act as though their business is to secure convictions. But in general such provisions are out of harmony with the
spirit and genius of the age. The people have no reason to fear their
own agents. A man who desires more than justice may prefer his
own attorney, but it is better for society and for all criminals in the
long run to have an impartial tribunal giving justice without fear or
favor. With such a tribunal it would not be long before litigants and
defendants in criminal actions would not care to have counsel. If
parties should insist, either the constitution should be amended or the
attorneys should be allowed to appear as counsel but only permitted
to argue points of substantive law. Of course counsel could advise
anyone outside of court and could prepare a pleading for him. At
present, while no one can be represented in court by anyone else than
an attorney, a party may always appear for himself. If the lumber
of pleading, evidence and practice were all removed, except as it was
handled by the court, parties would be only too anxious to avail
themselves of this privilege. It sometiffies seems as though attorneys,
not as individuals but collectively, have realized that the way to get
court business is to keep the rules of pleading, evidence and practice
as involved as possible and in their own hands. So long as present
conditions remain, litigants must have attorneys. Change these
conditions, and attorneys will not be needed. The only way to change
these conditions, however, is first to take the franchise of legal procedure away from attorneys.
(6) The remedy is not to appoint commissioners, who under
another, name shall do the work which judges should do; nor to establish legal aid societies for those who cannot afford attorneys to
do a work that is superfluous; nor to appoint public defenders to
neutralize and counteract the effect of public prosecutors, when
if there was no public prosecutor a public defender would be neither
needed nor desired. All legal signs .point to a legal procedure administered by judges as the only successful means of securing justice.

RESULTS.
Placing the administration of justice in the hands of judges
would primarily result in two things:
(1) The abolition of the technical rules of pleading, evidence
and practice, as mandatory rules of legal procedure.
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(2) The elimination of attorneys from the trial of cases and the
relegation of them to purely private business.
Incidentally many other beneficent results-all of the reforms
needed and demanded by the people-would follow.
(1) Expense would be reduced to a minimum. The expense
to the litigants would be almost insignificant, because they would
be saved the cost of attorneys and paper books on appeal. The
expense to society would be reduced because, though more judges
might be employed in the trial of a particular case, three judges would
dispose of twenty times as many cases as come before one judge now.
(2) Delays would be eliminated. Time would no longer be
consumed by attorneys by steps taken outside the court room. Juries
would be impanelled, as in England today, in a .fraction of the time
which it now often takes. The slow examination and cross-examination of witnesses when opposite attorneys are trying to keep the truth
back more than to secure it, the tedious and long-winded harangues
of counsel, objections, motions, appeals, new trials and long opinions
of judges would go to the limbo of things which- have stood in the
way of human progress.
(3) - Cases would be tried on their merits instead of according to
technicalities. People who are entitled to legal redress would not
lose it because their attorneys did not know how to draw a good
complaint or answer, or because they did not know how to introduce
their evidence, or were not shrewd enough in appellate practice.
There would be no reversals for tehnicalities. Men and women
would win cases because of the facts, not because they knew of the
most ingenious attorneys and employed them.
(4) Suits without merit would more and more cease to be instituted. Now the courts are the resorts of the wicked. Then the
general tone of society as well as of the courts would be elevated,
because the supposed instruments of justice could not be perverted to
selfish and unlawful ends.
(5) The character and standing of juries would be improved.
Prospective jurors would be treated with respect and consideration.
Now many attorneys vie with each other in getting bad jurors, i.e.,
those who will favor their side of the case. Then every effort would
be made to get the best jurors. Serving on the jury would be an honor,
and good men would cease to shun such duty.
(6) Witnesses would lose their partisanship. Under the present
system they enter into the spirit of the game and take sides with the
side which calls them. If they were examined by judges who represented neither side, but society-including themselves-they
would soon lose their partisanship. This would be especially import-
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ant in the case of expert witnesses, whose testimony is now generally
a farce and who generally are unjustifiably made a laughing stock.
(7) "The judges-who already hold a surprisingly high rank,
considering the nature of their training and the manner of their
selection generally in the states-would hold a higher rank. They
would be given greater responsibilities and with those responsibilities
would rise to a higher dignity.
(8) -Even the standing of the attorneys would be raised. The
profession would be purged of a horde of so-called attorneys, who are
now attracted to the legal profession because of the opportunities
afforded them because of their license to appear in court. Among
such are the shysters, ambulance-chasers, pettifoggers. blackmailers,
police court hangers-on, criminal law sharks, jury bribers, witness
fixers and makers, and any who will sell their talents to the highest
bidder. All these would leave the legal profession as tramps leave a
town which compels them to work. The standing of those who would
remain in the profession would be raised. At present litigants do
not choose attorneys (aside from reasons of friendships) because they
think they are honest-except to their clients-but because they think
they will win cases. This makes the honest attorney compete
with the dishonest; and, with the opportunities afforded to the dishonest attorney by our present system of legal procedure, the inevitable though imperceptible effect is the lowering of the character
of the bar as a whole. Remove this competition and the standing
of the bar would be raised.
At present attorneys have a monopoly of the administration of
justice, not only because no. one can get a chance of securing justice
without first getting an attorney, but because they have the right to
say who shall be admitted to their ranks. The high grade law schools
and a very few bar examiners are doing much to keep the unfit out
of the legal profession, but in general the bar examiners and the
attorneys, as their governing motive, think of the opportunity for
the young prospective practitioner to make a living by any of the
means dfforded by the legal profession, rather than of the needs of
society. The reform of turning the administration of justice over to
the judges and of leaving the other legal work to the attorneys should
be supplemented by raising the standards of qualifications of both
judges and attorneys. Probably the unfit will never wholly eliminate
themselves. The requirements for admission will have to be raised.
Mental qualifications, such as required by the leading law schools
of their students, will have to be required of all applicants. Moral
qualifications of truth, honesty, unselfishness and social ideals only
discoverable by an independent investigation will also have to be
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required. And these requirements will have to be enforced, not
by a committee of lawyers representing lawyers, but by a committee
(mostly lawyers) representing all the people.
(9) Many other incidental evil effects caused by our present
The trying of legal causes
legal procedure would be eliminated.
upon the theory of a legal contest causes positive as well as negative
bad results. It tends to engender hard feelings among attorneys,
litigants, jurors, witnesses and others who are opposed to each other
in the trial of cases, thus aggravating the injuries which originally
caused the law suit. All these positive evils would be abolished.
By such a reform as above outlined the people of the United
States of America could, in my judgment, make their legal procedure
an instrument for justice.

